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C. F. Richeson 
 
An Insanity Defense Should Be Available to Psychopaths 
 
ABSTRACT: Current law allows certain criminal defendants —not including 
psychopaths —an insanity defense.  Both Utilitarian and Retributivist rationales can be 
cited for the defense.  This essay argues that affording a defense like the insanity 
defense to criminal psychopaths is justified on much the same rationales.  Integral to 
the psychopathy syndrome is a set of neurocognitive deficits that render psychopaths 
significantly less deterrable than non-psychopaths:  first, psychopaths’ relative inability 
to recognize when a behavior pattern that once netted benefits now nets costs, and to 
change their behavior accordingly; second, their relative inability to form the mental 
associations between an aversive experience and the events which herald it; and third, 
their relative insusceptibility to fear, which results in the dread of further punishment 
being much reduced in them.  Psychopaths are also less subject to general deterrence, 
because the psychopath’s typical inability to conjure and be moved by emotional mental 
imagery blunts the warning effect of other offenders’ run-ins with the legal system.  
Psychopathy undercuts the Retributivist rationale for punishment because, due to their 
characteristic empathy deficit, psychopaths lack the concept of normativity, and so are 
not morally responsible agents.  Those who are not morally responsible do not deserve 
criminal blame.  It is therefore wrong to inflict criminal punishments on psychopaths.     
 
I.  Introduction 
I will argue that psychopaths should be allowed a defense analogous to the defense of insanity.  
The criminal law, which does not presently allow such a defense, should be changed accordingly.  The 
extent to which psychopaths can avail themselves of such a defense should depend on the extent of 
their impairment and on the type of crime with which they are charged.  I lack the space to answer in 
detail the question of how society should respond to the threat posed by dangerous psychopaths.  In 
future work, I will argue that psychopaths who are deemed to be dangerous should be subject to “civil 
commitment” under procedures like those recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court.1  
Current law allows certain criminal defendants —not including psychopaths2—an insanity 
defense.  Both Utilitarian and Retributivist rationales can be cited for the defense.  On the Utilitarian 
rationale, it would be useless to punish those who, due to mental illness, cannot be deterred from 
                                                          
1
 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
2
 Robert Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (1993) *hereinafter “Hare, 
Without Conscience”+, at 143; Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating 
the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 289, 292 (1998) (“*C+riminal 
offenders who are psychopaths are not candidates for the insanity defense”). 
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breaking the law.  On the Retributivist rationale, a person who has broken the law because he is 
mentally ill does not deserve criminal blame and punishment. 
I will argue that affording a defense like the insanity defense to criminal psychopaths is justified 
on much the same rationales.  Integral to the psychopathy syndrome is a set of neurocognitive deficits 
that render psychopaths significantly less subject to special deterrence than non-psychopaths.  The most 
important of these deficits are:  first, psychopaths’ inability, relative to non-psychopaths, to recognize 
when a behavior pattern that once netted benefits now nets costs, and to change their behavior 
accordingly; second, their relative inability to form the mental associations between an aversive 
experience, on the one hand, and the events which herald it, on the other; and third, their relative 
insusceptibility to fear, which results in the dread of further punishment being much reduced in them.  
Psychopaths are also less subject to general deterrence, because the psychopath’s typical inability to 
conjure and be moved by emotional mental imagery blunts the warning effect on him of other 
offenders’ run-ins with the legal system.3    
 As for the Retributivist rationale for punishment, it hinges on the criminal’s desert:  the offender 
should be punished because, and to the extent to which, he deserves punishment for his criminal act.4  I 
will argue that it is wrong to punish psychopaths retributively because, much like those to whom the law 
already affords an insanity defense, psychopaths are not morally responsible agents.  They are not 
morally responsible agents because they lack the concept of normativity.  A grasp of normativity is 
necessary for moral responsibility, because without it, we cannot understand or be motivated by moral 
reasons, and such capacity is necessary for moral responsibility.  One who is not morally responsible is 
not blameworthy.  Thus, psychopaths are not blameworthy.  But blame is an element of retributive 
criminal punishment, particularly punishment by imprisonment or execution:  whenever such 
punishments are inflicted, the infliction of them expresses blame.  It is therefore wrong to inflict criminal 
punishments on psychopaths.   
 The paper will proceed as follows.  In Section II, I will focus on the two chief Utilitarian rationales 
for punishment, special and general deterrence, and will argue that neither rationale justifies the 
                                                          
3
 Blair, R. J. R., Jones, L., Clark, F., and Smith, M., “The psychopathic individual: A lack of responsiveness to distress 
cues?” Psychophysiology 34: 192-98 (1997) *hereinafter “Blair et al. (1997)”+; Patrick et al. (1994). 
4
 See, e.g., Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (1988) *hereinafter “Lacey”+, 
at 16 (“classical retributivism in its strong form” claims that “the state has both a right and a duty to punish, in the 
sense of inflicting unpleasant consequences upon an offender in response to her offence to the extent that, and by 
reason of the fact that, she deserves that punishment.”).   
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criminal punishment of psychopaths.  In Section III I will make the analogous case with respect to 
Retributivist rationales for punishment.       
II. The Failure of the Various Utilitarian Theories of Punishment In Regards To Psychopaths 
Theories of punishment fall into two main categories:  Utilitarian and Retributivist.5  Utilitarian 
theories attempt to justify punishment on the grounds that the benefits it yields will outweigh the costs 
it imposes on those punished and on society.6  All the Utilitarian theories of punishment are geared 
towards crime-reduction,7 but each theory explains in a different way how punishment seeks to achieve 
this goal.  The standard list of Utilitarian theories comprises incapacitation, special deterrence, general 
deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation.8  This section will focus on how special and general 
deterrence fail to justify criminal punishment of psychopaths.   
II.1 Special Deterrence 
II.1.1 The Criminological Facts 
One of the two main Utilitarian justifications for punishing offenders is that punishment deters 
them from re-offending.  The state responds to the offender’s crime by subjecting him to an experience 
so memorably unpleasant, and so inextricably associated in his mind with criminality, that he 
subsequently recoils from committing further offenses.9  The success or failure of such a penological 
strategy can therefore be assessed by considering the rates at which offenders recidivate upon 
completion of their sentence.  For example, if 100% of offenders committed another crime after their 
release from prison, we would be able to conclude that special deterrence, for whatever reason, was 
not working. 
Criminal psychopaths recidivate at a rate far higher than that of the average offender.  An early 
study involving the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised10 followed the post-release careers of 231 
                                                          
5
 Michael S. Moore, “A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment” from Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the 
Relationship (Cambridge U. Press: 1984), pp. 233-39, excerpt published in Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore & Stephen J. 
Morse, Foundations of Criminal Law (Foundation Press: 1999) *hereinafter “FCL”+, at 64, 67.       
6
 FCL, at 67.   
7
 FCL, at 64. 
8
 FCL, 64-65; Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law (4
th
 ed. 2003) *hereinafter “LaFave”+, at 26-29 (listing the same 
theories, though referring to “special deterrence” as “*p+revention,” “denunciation” as “*e+ducation,” and 
“incapacitation” as “*r+estraint”).    
9
 LaFave, at 26-27. 
10
 Also known as the “PCL-R,” this is the standard tool for diagnosing psychopathy.   
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offenders.11  Three years after their release from prison, twenty-five percent of the non-psychopaths in 
this cohort were back in prison, while eighty percent of the psychopaths had been re-incarcerated.12  A 
later study which followed a different group of 299 offenders found that, within three years, sixty-five 
percent of the psychopaths had been convicted, versus twenty-five percent of the non-psychopaths.13  A 
meta-analysis published in 199814 concluded that, within one year of release from prison, psychopaths 
were three times more likely to recidivate, and four times more likely to recidivate violently, compared 
with the average offender; relative risk for re-offending ranged between 1.7 times and 6.5 times that of 
the average offender across the studies.15  Finally, a study which sought to establish the predictive 
power of the PCL-R followed 278 offenders after their release from prison.16  Of those offenders who 
qualified as psychopathic on the PCL-R, eighty-two percent were reconvicted, compared with forty 
percent of the non-psychopaths.17  Moreover, thirty-eight percent of those classified as highly 
psychopathic violently recidivated, compared with only 2.7% of those deemed mildly psychopathic.18     
Why is special deterrence so much less effective for psychopaths than for the average former 
prisoner?  One possible answer is that psychopathic offenders find the experience of punishment (that 
is, prison life) somehow less unpleasant than non-psychopathic offenders do, with the result that their 
memory of it fails to deter them from committing more crimes after their release.  The present essay, 
however, will focus on a different, though possibly related, explanation – that, due to a set of 
neurocognitive deficiencies characteristic of psychopathy, psychopaths are significantly less able than 
non-psychopaths to profit from their punishment in the ways society expects them to.   
Three of these characteristic deficits are especially germane.  First, psychopaths are significantly 
less able than non-psychopaths to recognize when a behavior pattern that once netted benefits now 
                                                          
11
 Hart, S. D. Kropp, P. R., Hare R. D., “Performance of male psychopaths following conditional release from prison, 
J. of Consulting & Clinical Psych., 56, 227-232 (1988) *hereinafter “Hart et al. (1988)”+. 
12
 Hart et al. (1988). 
13
 Serin, R. C. & Amos, N. L., “The role of psychopathy in the assessment of dangerousness,” Int’l J. of L. & 
Psychiatry, 18, 231-38 (1995).   
14
 Hemphill, J. F., Hare, R. D., Wong S., “Psychopathy and recidivism: a review,” Legal and Criminological Psych., 3, 
139-70 (1998) [hereinafter Hemphill et al. (1998)]. 
15
 Hemphill et al. (1998). 
16
 Hare, R. D., Clark, D., Grann, M., Thornton, D., “Psychopathy and the predictive validity of the P. C. L-R: an 
international perspective,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 18, 623-45 (2000) *hereinafter “Hare, Clark, et al. 
(2000)”+.   
17
 Hare, Clark, et al. (2000). 
18
 Hare, Clark, et al. (2000). 
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nets costs, and to change their behavior accordingly.19  Second, psychopaths are significantly less able to 
form the requisite mental associations between an aversive experience, on the one hand, and the 
events which herald it, on the other.20  Third, it is, baldly put, significantly harder to frighten a 
psychopath than it is to frighten a non-psychopath, with the result that the dread of further punishment, 
a desideratum of deterrence, is much reduced in them.21     
II.1.2 Psychopath’s Passive-Avoidance-Learning, Response-Reversal, and Extinction Deficits 
II.1.2.1 The Neuroscience Studies  
Passive avoidance learning (“PAL”) is one’s ability to identify those stimuli responding to which 
will result in punishment to oneself and to inhibit one’s responses to those stimuli.22  Neuroscientific 
experiments involving psychopaths have shown them to be characteristically deficient in PAL.23  For 
example, in a study24 of seventy-nine prisoners, the subjects were shown eight two-digit numbers on a 
computer screen.  Each number was displayed ten separate times, for a total of eighty trials.  Some of 
the numbers were associated with a reward, others with a punishment.  Rewards consisted of chips 
which the subjects could cash in after the study for soft drinks and snacks, while punishments consisted 
of subtractions of one of these chips from their total winnings.  The subjects’ task was to determine 
which numbers would yield a reward and which a punishment, and not to respond to the latter.25  White 
prisoners who scored a 23 or higher on the PCL-R were significantly more likely to respond to 
punishment-associated stimuli (i.e., commit “errors of commission”) than non-psychopaths.26   
                                                          
19
 Thornquist, M. H. & Zuckerman, M., “Psychopathy, Passive-Avoidance Learning and Basic Dimensions of 
Personality,” Person. Indiv. Diff., Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 525-534 (1995) *hereinafter “Thornquist et al. (1995)”+; Mitchell 
et al. (2002) (same); Newman, J. P. & Schmitt, W. A., “Passive Avoidance in Psychopathic Offenders: A Replication 
and Extension,” J. of Abnormal Psych. 3, 527-532 (1998) *hereinafter “Newman et al. (1998)”+, at 527. 
20
 Hare & Quinn (1971) (audio cue for imminent painful electric shock elicits only attenuated dermal response in 
Ps); Hare, Without Conscience, at 54 n. 16; Flor et al. (2002) (replicates these results using an aversive odor); 
Christianson et al. (1995). 
21
 Flor et al. (2002) 
22
 Newman et al. (1998), at 527.    
23
 Newman et al. (1998), at 528 (this result “regarded as one of the best replicated findings in psychopathy 
research*,+” with citations).  
24
 Thornquist et al. (1995).  
25
 Thornquist et al. (1995), at 528. 
26
 Thornquist et al. (1995), at 530.  Oddly, in Black psychopaths, no correlation between PCL-R score and errors of 
commission was found.  Thornquist et al. (1995), at 532.  
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In an earlier study of prisoners,27 also, the psychopaths among them committed significantly 
more commissive errors than the non-psychopaths.28  In addition, when the possibility of reward was 
removed, the psychopaths performed no differently from the non-psychopaths,29 leading to the 
conclusion that psychopaths “show a passive-avoidance learning deficit in situations involving a reward-
punishment or approach-avoidance conflict.”30  That is,when the experiment situation contained 
possibilities both for reward and for punishment, psychopaths characteristically failed, significantly more 
than did the non-psychopaths, to learn to inhibit those responses that resulted in punishment.   
A different approach to establishing much the same deficiency is the so-called “four pack card-
playing task.”  One study that incorporated this task involved 51 prisoners drawn from various high-
security prisons around London.31  Those who scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R were deemed 
psychopathic for the study’s purposes, while those scoring 20 or below were qualified as non-
psychopaths; those whose scores fell between were excluded from the subject pool.32  The subjects 
were presented with a computerized version of a card game.  Picture representations of four packs of 
cards appeared on the computer screen, all face down, their backs all identical to one another just as if 
the packs were real.  The subjects were instructed to play the cards so as to maximize their points.  
Unknown to them at the start, play from two of the packs yielded high point rewards, but even higher 
punishments, while the other two packs yielded lower point rewards, but also lower punishments.  
Playing only from the low-reward-lower-punishment packs maximizes the player’s point total, while 
playing from either of the high-risk packs results in a net negative score.33   
The non-psychopaths in the group gravitated towards the low-risk, point-maximizing decks over 
the course of the game, averaging twelve selections from the high-risk packs in the first block of twenty 
turns and seven in the last, with just under ten, just under nine, and just under eight sequentially in the 
                                                          
27
 Newman, J. P. & Kosson, D. S., “Passive avoidance learning in psychopathic and nonpsychopathic offenders,” J. of 
Abnormal Psych., 3, 252-256 (1986) *hereinafter “Newman & Kosson (1986)”+. 
28
 Newman & Kosson (1986). 
29
 Newman & Kosson (1986). 
30
 Thornquist et al. (1995), at 526. 
31
 Mitchell, D. G. V., Colledge, E., Leonard, J. & Blair, R. J. R., Neuropsychologia 40, 2013-2022 (2002) [hereinafter 
“Mitchell et al. (2002)”+, at 2014. 
32
 Mitchell et al. (2002), at 2015.   
33
 Mitchell et al. (2002), at 2015. 
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intervening blocks.34  The psychopaths, on the other hand, did not.  Their initial average was just under 
twelve, and ended at just under eleven.35   
A variation (termed “extinction”) on this task is particularly relevant here.36  In the task subjects 
have to play a card.  While initially playing a card is rewarded with money, as the game progresses the 
probability of reward decreases.  Psychopaths persist  in playing the cards even when this is associated 
with punishment.   
II.1.2.2 Significance for Psychopaths’ Recidivism 
The environment of the newly-released psychopathic offender is analogous to the situations 
presented by the passive-avoidance learning, response-reversal, and extinction studies.  First, like them, 
it presents possibilities for both reward and punishment.  In the experiment situations, chips or points 
could be won or lost depending on whether the subject learned, though trial and error, which responses 
yielded reward and which punishment and chose the rewarding response.  Likewise, the newly-released 
offender’s environment is fraught with such possibilities.  In any given transaction he can choose the 
lawful option, one that yields comparatively low immediate reward but also no potential for 
punishment, or he can choose the option associated with high immediate rewards but also high risk:  to 
re-offend.  This same choice is, of course, faced by all ex-prisoners now on the street.  But the 
psychopaths among them have particular difficulty, due to the very neurocognitive deficits spotlighted 
by these studies. 
Second, like them, the former prisoner’s environment requires him to take account of 
information regarding disparate reward and punishment expectancies and to use it to change his 
pattern of choices on the fly.  Though this dynamic is also present in the four-pack card playing task and 
the numbers recognition task, the extinction task frames the issue most starkly.  There, the subject must 
recognize that a choice which once rewarded him – playing a particular card – now more often results in 
loss, and refrain from it.  Likewise, the newly released ex-convict’s environment requires him to take 
account of the information which society has provided him in the form of punishment, and to change his 
                                                          
34
 Mitchell et al. (2002), at 2016-2017. 
35
 Mitchell at al. (2002), at 2016-2017; see also (a single-pack version of this task, with results analogous to those of 
Mitchell et al. (2002)). 
36
 Newman, J. P., Patterson, C. M., Kosson, D. S., “Response preservation in psychopaths,” J. of Abnormal Psych., 
96:145-148 (1987) *hereinafter “Newman et al. (1987)”+. 
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pattern of choices accordingly.  Psychopaths, however, in the extinction task as in life,37 
characteristically persist in a losing bet long after non-psychopaths have cut their losses.        
Third, the normal parole situation strikingly resembles the end phase of the extinction task, 
when a formerly rewarding option is very likely to impose a loss if chosen.  Supervision of the parolee by 
the parole officer dramatically increases the risk to the parolee of illegal acts.  As the relevant statistics 
show, however, psychopathic parolees persist in crime to a much greater degree than non-psychopathic 
parolees.  
II.1.3 Psychopaths’ Relative Immunity to Threats of Pain or Punishment 
II.1.3.1 The Neuroscience Studies 
Psychopaths are characteristically less able, relative to non-psychopathic control subjects, to 
form mental associations between a painful or otherwise unpleasant sensory event or stimulus and the 
cues that herald its occurrence.38  A technique typically employed by researchers to establish this deficit 
involves the administering of an electric shock to the subject, cued by a tone, and an apparatus to 
measure how readily the subject’s skin conducts electricity in the interval between the cue tone and the 
shock, relative to the pre-tone period.39  The subject’s skin conductance is a direct measure of his 
arousal in anticipation of the painful shock he is about to receive.40  Weaker arousal indicates weaker 
aversive conditioning to the painful stimulus.41  Psychopaths characteristically show much weaker skin 
conductance than non-psychopaths in studies like these. 
Thus, for example, a 1971 study42 featured three distinct tones of 10 seconds’ duration, each 
cuing a different stimulus – nothing; the two-second visual representation of a nude female; or a painful 
shock lasting a half-second.43  The psychopaths in the group “gave much smaller electrodermal 
                                                          
37
 Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (5
th
 ed. 1978), at 54-55, 58, 68, 262 (“*W+hen serious criminal tendencies do 
emerge in the psychopath, they gain ready expression, and … no punishment can discourage them.”), 346 (“It is my 
opinion that no punishment is likely to make the psychopath change his ways.”) 
38
 Flor, H., Birbaumer, N., Hermann, C., Ziegler, S. & Patrick, C., “Aversive Pavlovian conditioning in psychopaths: 
Peripheral and central correlates,” Psychophysiology 39: 505-518 (2002) [hereinafter “Flor et al. (2002)”+, at 505 
(“Deficient emotional responding and especially a lack of conditioned aversive responses have been viewed as one 
of the core features of psychopathy.”).   
39
 Lykken, D., “A Study of Anxiety in the Sociopathic Personality,” J. of Abnormal & Social Psych. 55: 6-10 (1957) 
*hereinafter “Lykken (1957)”+, 7-8 (the classic study). 
40
 Lykken (1957), at 9; Flor et al. (2002), at 506.  
41
 Flor et al. (2002), at 506. 
42
 Hare, R. D. & Quinn, M., “Psychopathy and Autonomic Conditioning,” J. of Abnormal Psych. Vol. 77 No. 3, 223-
235 (1971) *hereinafter “Hare & Quinn (1971)”+. 
43
 Hare & Quinn (1971), at 225. 
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responses to the shock” cues than the other subjects.44  Another, similar study used an unpleasant odor 
as the cued stimulus instead of an electric shock,45 with similar results.46  These and other studies 
suggest that psychopaths are characteristically impaired in the formation of conditioned aversive 
responses on an autonomic level.47   
II.1.3.2 Significance for Psychopaths’ Recidivism 
The situation presented in skin-conductance studies is analogous to that of the newly-released 
offender who is in the process of considering whether to re-offend.  Special deterrence depends on the 
offender’s ability to associate criminality with the remembered pain of punishment.  When it works 
properly, the criminal is deterred from re-offending by the aversive emotional response he has to cues 
in the situation – the weapon in his hand, for example, or the fear on the face of his would-be victim.  
These cues remind him of imprisonment, an experience much more painful and arduous than a simple 
electric shock, and the resulting dread causes him to change course.  
The psychopath, however, is characteristically impaired in forming the necessary associations on 
an emotional level, so that the threat of further punishment gains significantly less of a purchase on his 
mind.  He can understand that punishment is likely to follow upon his commission of a crime – no 
relevant intellectual impairment typifies psychopathy – but the threat lacks for him the deep emotional 
force which special deterrence depends on.  Put differently, the deck is stacked against the remembered 
pain of punishment deterring the psychopathic offender from re-offending.48            
II.2 General Deterrence 
According to the general deterrence theory of punishment, “the sufferings of the criminal for 
the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others from committing future crimes, lest they 
suffer the same unfortunate fate.”49  On the general deterrence rationale, “those who are deterred are 
                                                          
44 Hare & Quinn (1971), at 232; see also Hare, R. D., Without Conscience (1992), at 54 (“Laboratory experiments 
using biomedical recorders have shown that psychopaths lack the physiological responses normally associated 
with fear.”) (referring to skin-conductance experiments like this); Hare, R. D. (1998) “Psychopathy, affect, and 
behavior” In D. Cooke, A. Forth, & R. Hare (Eds.), Psychopathy: Theory, research, and implications for society  (pp. 
105–137). Dordrecht: Kluwer (review of skin-conductance research on psychopaths); Raine, A., “Schizotypical and 
borderline features in psychopathic criminals,” Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 717–722 (1992). 
45
 Flor et al. (2002), at 506. 
46
 Flor et al. (2002), at 515. 
4747
 Blair, James, Mitchell, Derek & Blair, Karina, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain (Blackwell: 2005) 
[hereinafter “Blair et al. (2005)”+, at 49.   
48 In this connection, see also Patrick et al. (1994), at 523 (“the emotional component of cognition is intrinsic to 
future planning.  That is, in normal individuals stimuli that have previously been associated with aversive 
consequences subsequently evoke unpleasant emotional images.  These images cue inhibition and avoidance and 
may thus block new antisocial behavior.  In psychopaths, this affective component of memory is diminished.”). 
49
 LaFave, at 28. 
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in the general population rather than the offenders themselves.”50  In order for general deterrence to 
work, then, the would-be offender must learn that those who commit a crime, and are caught and 
convicted of it, are punished.  He must view the likelihood of punishment following crime as high 
enough to make the game not worth the candle.  Most relevantly for present purposes, he must imagine 
being punished in the threatened ways, and be frightened enough by these mental images to avoid 
committing a crime.  
Psychopaths, however, are characteristically impaired in responding emotionally to mental 
imagery.  A 1989 study involving non-psychopaths found pronounced elevation in heart rate as part of 
their response to frightening mental imagery versus neutral imagery.51  Subsequent studies involving 
psychopaths have consistently found much smaller elevation, “reflecting an impairment of the normal 
associative processes by which symbolic stimuli … prompt affect.”52  For example, a 1994 study53 
involved a subject pool of 54 imprisoned sex offenders, equal thirds of whom were non-psychopaths, 
moderately psychopathic, and highly psychopathic.54  Each subject was asked to memorize three pairs of 
sentences, one pair at a time, each pair consisting of one neutral and one frightful sentence.55  The 
playing of a tone would cue him to silently repeat the corresponding sentence, whether the neutral or 
the frightful one; the tone played shortly thereafter would cue him to imagine himself, as vividly as he 
was able, to be participating in the situation which the sentence described.  Heart rate, skin 
conductance, and EMG activity were all monitored.  In psychopathic subjects, the difference in their 
physiological responses between the neutral and frightful stimuli was significantly smaller than those of 
                                                          
50
 FCL, at 64. 
51 “Recently, Vrana, Cuthbert, and Lang (1989) developed a cue-controlled imagery task in which responses were 
measured during brief (6-s[econd]) image periods.  Subjects memorized affective sentences and then listened to a 
series of tones; changes in tone pitch signaled the subjects to recall and imagine the memorized material.  Large 
differences in heart rate (HR) response were found during imagery of fear-related as opposed to neutral 
sentences.  The average HR wave forms for the two types of sentence … showed a distinct, time-locked HR 
increase during fear image periods.”  Patrick, C., Cuthbert, B., and Lang, P., “Emotion in the Criminal Psychopath: 
Fear Image Processing,” J. of Abnormal Psych. Vol. 103 No. 3 523-534 (1994) *hereinafter “Patrick et al. (1994)”+, at 
524 (citing Vrana, S. R., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J., “Processing fearful and neutral sentences: Memory and heart 
rate change,” Cognition and Emotion, 3, 179-195 (1989)). 
52
 Patrick et al. (1994), at 524. 
53
 Patrick et al. (1994). 
54
 The average PCL-R scores for the three groups were 13.4, 25.8, and 33.3, respectively.  Patrick et al. (1994), at 
525. 
55
 “Neutral sentences described mildly pleasant, relaxing situations (e.g., ‘I am relaxing on my living room couch, 
looking out the window on a sunny autumn day’); fearful *sic] sentences described threatening, arousing situations 
(e.g., ‘Taking a shower, alone in the house, I hear the sound of someone forcing the door, and I panic’).”  Patrick et 
al. (1994), at 525.     
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either the moderately psychopathic subjects or the non-psychopathic ones.56  “Text cues that prompted 
large physiological reactions in low-psychopathy subjects elicited much smaller responses in subjects 
with features of psychopathic personality*.+”57  The authors go on to state: 
In naturalistic settings, an affective imagery deficit would be manifested as a failure to 
review the harmful consequences of one's actions [citation] and as an inability to 
entertain new behavioral strategies [citation].  This helps to account for the reckless, 
impulsive life-styles of psychopaths.58  
 
 General deterrence depends on a robust aversive emotional response on the part of the person 
to be deterred.  He must picture himself being punished for committing a crime and find his emotional 
reaction to this mental image so unpleasant that it motivates him to avoid offending.  Non-psychopaths 
exhibit this sort of visceral response to unpleasant mental imagery, with salutary results for them and 
for society at large.  Psychopaths’ responses thereto, however, are much attenuated, and as a 
consequence the punishment of others deters psychopaths far less than it does non-psychopaths.  
II.3 The Deterrence Rationales Fail to Justify the Punishment of Psychopaths   
 In sum, punishment does not deter psychopaths as well as it deters non-psychopaths due to a 
set of neurocognitive deficiencies characteristic of psychopathy.  Psychopaths perform poorly on tasks 
that require passive avoidance learning, response reversal, and extinction, all of which are analogous to 
abilities which the special deterrence theory assumes the public to possess.  General deterrence, for its 
part, assumes that accounts of the punishment offenders receive will conjure, in the minds of those who 
presently obey the law, images frightening enough to keep them honest; but psychopaths cannot 
respond to such accounts in the expected ways.  To rely on deterrence theories to justify the 
punishment of psychopaths is therefore much like forcing one with a badly sprained ankle to play tennis, 
and then relying on the rules of the game to justify adjudicating a loss to him where the consequences 
thereof are deprivation of liberty or life.   
III. The Failure of Retributivism to Justify the Criminal Punishment of Psychopaths      
This portion of the essay will argue that it is wrong to punish psychopaths retributively because, 
much like those to whom the law already affords an insanity defense, psychopaths are not morally 
responsible agents.  They are not morally responsible agents because they lack the concept of 
normativity.  A grasp of normativity is necessary for moral responsibility, because without it, we cannot 
understand or be motivated by moral reasons, and such capacity is necessary for moral responsibility.  
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One who is not morally responsible is not blameworthy.  Thus, psychopaths are not blameworthy.  But 
blame is an element of retributive criminal punishment, particularly punishment by imprisonment or 
execution:  whenever such punishments are inflicted, the infliction of them expresses blame.  It is 
therefore wrong to inflict these criminal punishments on psychopaths. 
III.1 Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible Agents Because They Lack The Concept of Normativity 
III.1.1 On the Retributivist Rationale, the Law Excuses Those Whom It Deems Insane on the 
Grounds that They Are Not Morally Responsible for their Offense 
On the Retributivist rationale, a person who has broken the law because she is mentally ill is not 
criminally punished because she does not deserve such treatment.  She does not deserve punishment 
because her illness deprived her of the rational capacity to form the mental state necessary to be 
morally responsible for the crime with which she is charged.59  In short, the law excuses the insane on 
the grounds that they are “mad, not bad.”60     
This section will argue that psychopaths, like those to whom the law already grants the insanity 
defense, lack moral responsibility for crimes they commit.  This is because psychopaths, due to a set of 
neurocognitive deficits characteristic of their disorder, lack an understanding of the concept of 
normativity.  This lack of understanding is apparent from their failure to appreciate the distinction 
between moral and merely conventional rules.           
III.1.2 Psychopaths’ Failure to Understand the Distinction Between Moral and Conventional 
Transgressions Indicates that They Lack a Concept of Normativity 
III.1.2.1 The Moral/Conventional Distinction 
The moral/conventional distinction is the distinction between moral rules, on the one hand, and 
conventions, on the other.  The distinction was first used in child development research in the early 
1980s for the purpose of studying the process by which young children develop a moral sense.61  It goes 
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back at least to Aristotle, however,62 and “is, in part, derived from criteria given in philosophical 
analyses*.+”63  Conventions are social rules, “shared behaviors … whose meanings are defined by the 
constituted system in which they are embedded.”64  They are “constitutive *of+ or defined by existing 
social arrangements,”65 and are intended to “serv*e+ functions of social coordination[.+”66  So, for 
example, social rules regarding what attire is appropriate for a given social occasion, which member of a 
party is entitled to pass first through a doorway, and how loudly one should speak in various social 
settings are all conventional rules.67  Such rules are in force only because of prevailing social consensus.   
Moral rules, by contrast, “are unconditionally obligatory, generalizable, and impersonal insofar 
as they stem from concepts of welfare, justice, and rights*.+”68  Unlike conventional rules, moral rules 
“are not seen as solely determined by consensus, agreement, or received wisdom.”69  In short, “within 
the literature on this distinction [citations], moral transgressions have been defined by their 
consequences for the rights and welfare of others, and social conventional transgressions have been 
defined as violations of the behavioral uniformities that structure social interactions within social 
systems.”70 
In using this distinction, researchers were seeking answers of two sorts.  First, what criteria do 
individuals use to tell moral transgressions apart from conventional ones?  And second, how do 
individuals reason about courses of action?  The first inquiry involves questions of “whether the action 
would be right or wrong in the absence of a rule or law, if the act would be all right if permitted by a 
person in authority …, whether an act would be all right if there were a general agreement as to its 
acceptability, and whether the act would be all right if it were accepted in another group or culture.”71 
Researchers typically presented stories to children which involved various sorts of 
transgressions and asked them these questions.  In more than sixty such studies, performed in many 
different cultures, children and adolescents consistently judge transgressions involving physical or 
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psychological harm and fairness or justice to be moral transgressions, and that such acts would remain 
transgressive even in the absence of authority, rules, or consensus.72  Transgressions not involving such 
harms, on the other hand, were viewed as transgressions of conventional rules, which did depend for 
their transgressive quality on social consensus or authority.73  Moral transgressions were also usually 
viewed as being more serious than conventional ones.74  Though “studies show that a distinction 
between moral and conventional transgressions becomes more consistent and focused by about the 
ages of [four] or [five] years[,]”75 normal children as young as three years of age make the distinction.76  
III.1.2.2 Psychopaths Characteristically Fail to Distinguish Between Transgressions of Moral Rules 
and Transgressions of Conventional Rules 
In a 1995 study involving ten psychopathic and ten non-psychopathic77 inmates of a forensic 
hospital, all but one of whom had killed, the subjects were presented with eight stories.  Four of the 
stories featured children assaulting other children or destroying property; the other four involved cross-
dressing or minor classroom disruption.78  After each subject was read a story, he was asked a series of 
four questions, each of which was meant to get at a different aspect of the moral/conventional 
distinction.  These aspects were the transgression’s permissibility, its seriousness, the reason why the 
act might be bad or wrong, and the authority-dependence or not of the act’s transgressiveness.79  While 
the non-psychopaths in the subject group significantly distinguished moral from conventional 
transgressions on all three of the permissibility, seriousness, and authority-dependence dimensions 
(“criterion judgments”), the psychopaths did not.80  In other words, “*u+nlike the non*-]psychopathic 
offenders, the psychopathic group did not judge the acceptability of moral transgressions to be any less 
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dependent upon authority jurisdiction than conventional transgressions.”81    These results were 
replicated later that year with twice as many subjects,82 and in a 1997 study involving children with 
psychopathic tendencies.83   
The objective normative force that philosophers have long viewed as being part and parcel of 
moral rules,84 and which even normally developing children as young as thirty-nine months of age 
associate with them, is thus completely lost on psychopaths.  Neil Levy argues that psychopaths’ 
inability to view transgressions as anything other than transgressions of conventional rules renders them 
unresponsive to specifically moral reasons to perform or refrain from certain actions.85  This seems 
correct, for if all rules of behavior appear to me to be like rules that prescribe the use of salad forks and 
soup spoons to consume the corresponding food items or that prohibit smoking in the midst of a 
religious ceremony, I will be much more likely than I would otherwise be to transgress them, including 
those that forbid inflicting physical harm on others.  Cordelia Fine and Jeanette Kennett86 regard 
psychopaths’ blindness to the moral/conventional distinction as conclusive evidence that psychopaths 
are unable to appreciate the difference between moral and conventional transgressions. 
Both Levy and Fine and Kennett trace psychopaths’ M/C blindness to their notorious empathy 
deficit, arguing that the essential difference between moral and conventional transgressions lies in the 
tendency of moral transgressions to directly cause others to suffer, a tendency absent from 
conventional trangressions.87   This is an idea with which David Hume would sympathize.  Kant, for his 
part, would agree that psychopaths lack the concept of normativity – not, of course, because they lack 
empathy, but because their equally notorious egocentrism and grandiosity render them invulnerable to 
the motivational force which normative rules exert on the moral agent.  I will turn now to these classic 
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views for the light they shed on psychopathic moral blindness.  I will then enlist Susan Wolf’s “sane deep 
self view” to argue that psychopaths are morally insane, and so lack moral responsibility. 
III.1.3 Two Classic Views:  Hume and Kant on Psychopathy   
III.1.3.1 Hume 
 Reason cannot be the source of our moral principles, according to Hume, because any genuine 
moral principle must be capable of motivating the moral agent.88  Morals are classed under “practical” 
philosophy, after all, not “speculative,” and if morality had no influence on “human passions and 
actions,” it would be a useless, merely academic study.89  The purpose of moral philosophy is “to teach 
us our duty,” and to “beget … habits” of behavior that include avoiding vice and cultivating virtue.90  
Reason, however, has no such motivational power.91   
For this latter proposition Hume offers several arguments in Treatise II.iii.3,92 the most 
important of which he revisits (and strengthens)93 at Treatise III.i.1.94  Reason, he argues, is concerned 
with discovering truth or falsehood, which “consists in agreement or disagreement either to the real 
relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.”  But neither of these things is the subject 
matter of morality, because “our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such 
agreement or disagreement*.+”  They are, instead, natural facts, complete in themselves, with no 
necessary relation or reference to other things; consequently, there is nothing with which they can 
agree or disagree.95  In short, morality – the province of our passions, volitions, and actions – is simply 
not reason’s subject matter.96  Later, Hume writes that reason cannot motivate us because “inferences 
and conclusions … of themselves have no hold of the affections, nor set in motion the active powers of 
men*.+”97  Virtuous actions “take possession of the heart,” he writes, and so move us to emulate them.  
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By contrast, the “intelligible … evident … probable … true”  – that is, the products of reason – “procure*+ 
only the the cool assent of the understanding*.+”98   
Reason therefore, cannot be the source of morality.  Instead, our moral judgment and moral 
motivation “depend on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole 
species*.+”99  The linchpin of this moral sense is “sympathy,”100 or “fellow-feeling”101 (what modern 
English calls “empathy”102).  “If any man, from a cold insensibility or narrow selfishness of temper, is 
unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images 
of vice and virtue[.+”103  It is because of our natural proclivity to participate emotionally in the happiness 
or misery of our fellow human beings that we perceive acts as virtuous or vicious.  Our empathy causes 
us to feel a pleasant sense of approbation at the sight of actions which we perceive to be useful or 
agreeable to the agent herself or to others.104  Hume cites the attractiveness of actions which are useful 
to society at large against the position that all our moral judgments are traceable to self-love.105  This 
attractiveness would be completely inexplicable were not “fellow-feeling” an essential part of our 
faculty of moral judgment.106  Likewise, Hume explains the sense of appobation which we feel on 
encountering a stranger’s agreeable demeanor and social graces in part by our imagining how much 
pleasure they must give to his friends.107  This moral feeling of approbation simply is our moral judgment 
that the action is virtuous.  Thus, without the empathy on which such approbation depends, we would 
be morally blind, unable to make distinctions between virtue and vice. 
III.1.3.1.5 Hume on Psychopathy 
Hume holds that we possess a faculty of moral judgment only because we also possess 
empathy.  Evidence from psychopathy seems to be consistent with this proposition, for psychopaths 
lack empathy, and appear completely insensible to moral distinctions.  Two of the PCL-R’s criteria for a 
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diagnosis of psychopathy are lack of remorse or guilt (Item 6) and lack of empathy (Item 8).108  These 
have long been viewed as among the typifying characteristics of the syndrome.109  Indeed, Robert Hare 
views the empathy deficit exhibited by psychopaths as lying at the root of their emotional and 
interpersonal problems, particularly their egocentricity and lack of remorse.  He writes that psychopaths 
“seem unable to ‘get into the skin’ or to ‘walk in the shoes’ of others, except in a purely intellectual 
sense.  The feelings of other people are of no concern to” them.110  Whereas some professionals – 
soldiers, for instance, or doctors – must become less sensitive to the suffering they encounter in their 
professions in order to remain effective, psychopaths typically “display a general lack of empathy.”111 
One way in which this deficit expresses itself in a form suitable for neuroscientific measurement 
is through psychopaths’ reduced emotional autonomic response, as compared with non-psychopaths, to 
images of people in distress.  In a 1997 skin-conductance study,112 eighteen psychopaths (PCL-R score of 
30 or higher) and eighteen non-psychopaths (20 or lower) were shown a series of color slides.  Of these 
slides, five depicted “distress cues” (pictures of a crying face, for example), five depicted threatening 
images, and eight depicted neutral objects.113  The psychopaths’ skin-conductance response to the 
threatening and the neutral stimuli were approximately the same as those of the non-psychopaths.114  
Their response to the distress cues, however, was only slightly more than half that exhibited by the non-
psychopaths.115  The authors link this finding directly to the deficits in the psychopaths’ empathy and 
guilt/remorse.116  A follow-up study117 employing a virtually identical procedure, but involving children 
with psychopathic tendencies rather than adult psychopaths, found, if anything, an even more profound 
impairment in the children than in the adults.118  
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Hume thinks of moral philosophy as a branch of empirical psychology.  In his view, virtue and 
vice are simply what our moral sense tells us they are, with our moral sense, in turn, firmly grounded in 
our nature as human beings.  Put differently, moral distinctions are what they are because we are such 
as we are.  Kant, in contrast, holds that in order for any principle to be a genuine moral law, it must be 
able to command all rational beings, insofar as they are rational, however they may otherwise be 
constituted.119  No empirical approach will allow us to formulate a moral law, because the only 
experience we have of rational natures is limited to our own.  Empiricism also fails us here because the 
moral law must command rational natures as such; accordingly, the moral law must be derived a priori 
from the nature of rationality itself.120 
 Like Hume, however, Kant thought that any genuine moral law applicable to human beings must 
have motivational power.121  Indeed, one of Kant’s main purposes in writing the Critique of Practical 
Reason (“CPracR”) was to demonstrate how the categorical imperative, derived a priori in the Grounding 
from reason alone, could be valid for us – that is, how it could be an incentive, “a kind of motivation 
from which human beings can act.”122  Thus, Kant begins the third chapter of the CPracR by reiterating 
that in order for any action to be morally good, it must be the act of a will which has been determined 
immediately by the moral law,123 without any moral feeling in the agent being presupposed as a hook 
for the moral law to latch onto, à la Hume.124  Rather, the moral agent’s consciousness of the moral law 
must itself suffice to incentivize moral conduct on her part.  Kant then takes his problem to be 
determining a priori precisely how the moral law accomplishes this.125   
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 Kant’s answer is that the moral law becomes an incentive for us through the respect which our 
recognition of it causes us to feel.126  In the Grounding, Kant wrote that in order for a moral duty to have 
the force of a command (which all duties must have if they are moral), that duty must be grounded in a 
law which can be an object of respect.127  This is why, in Kant’s view, desires or envisaged effects cannot 
ground duties.  No mere effect can be an object of respect because reason is the ultimate source of 
normativity, and any given effect can have come about without any rational agency having wrought it.128  
Hence utility cannot be the basis for duty.  Nor can any inclination, however noble, ground a duty, 
because no inclination on the part of another subjective will like our own has such authority over us as 
to immediately determine our own will through that authority, as a duty must be able to do if it is truly 
normative.129  Only the moral law, founded in reason, can be an object of respect.  Respect for the moral 
law is: 
the immediate recognition of its authority, or the direct determination of the will by the 
law.  To be moved by, or to act out of, respect is to recognize the [m]oral [l]aw as a 
source of value, or reasons for action, that are unconditionally valid and overriding 
relative to other kinds of reasons; in particular, they outweigh the reasons provided by 
one’s desires.  Respect is the attitude which it is appropriate to have towards a law, in 
which one acknowledges its authority and is motivated to act accordingly.130 
How, then, does this purely rational131 recognition of the moral law acquire “influence on the will,” as it 
must in order to be valid for us?132   
 Kant is adamant that the motivational power of the moral law depends neither on any pre-
existing emotion133 nor on any affective force, intermediate between our rational recognition of the 
moral law and the act which it commands, which moves us towards the act.134  Rather, the moral law 
influences our will, not by impelling it affectively towards moral action, but by removing whatever 
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obstacles the moral agent’s own psychological constitution may present in the form of contrary 
inclinations.135  These inclinations come in two varieties, being generated by two forms of selfishness:  
“self-love” and “self-conceit.”136  Kant defines self-love as “predominant benevolence towards 
oneself.”137  A natural and necessary kind of selfishness, involved in such vital matters as matching 
means with ends,138 self-love is merely checked or curbed by respect for the moral law, and disciplined 
by it into a self-love which is consistent with the demands of reason.139  Self-conceit, on the other hand, 
is a pathological form of “self-satisfaction” and consequent self-assertion.  “The object of self-conceit is 
a form of esteem or personal importance which you can only achieve when you deny it to some 
others.”140  It considers its own subjective maxims as worthy of being universally legislated.141  Our 
recognition of the moral law manifests affectively in us as a “striking down” and “humiliation” of self-
conceit.142  This is the “affective aspect” of the respect which our recognition of the moral law works in 
us, and it is essentially negative.143   
III.1.3.2.5 Kant on Psychopathy 
 As Kant writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, “The respect for the law, which is, subjectively, 
called the moral feeling, is identical with the consciousness of one’s duty.”144  Psychopaths cannot 
experience respect for the law, and thus can never be brought to a consciousness of their duty, because 
(to employ Kant’s terminology) their self-conceit cannot be humiliated.  In modern clinical parlance, 
their “egocentricity and grandiosity”145 are not subject to revision or alteration in light of any 
contradictory evidence.   
 Psychopaths are narcissists par excellence.  They seem to come into the world equipped with an 
invincible belief in their own specialness and superiority, a highly inflated sense of their own worth 
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entirely divorced from what more rational persons might consider to be relevant evidence.146  
Psychopaths “often come across as arrogant, shameless braggarts – self-assured, opinionated, 
domineering, and cocky.”147  By the same token, they typically view the ideas and opinions of others as 
being utterly without value.  It is hard not to see instantiated in psychopaths the “self-conceit” which 
Kant talks about as being an obstacle which respect for the moral law must crush if the moral agent is to 
become conscious of his duty.  Indeed, in a manner consistent with Kant’s depiction of the self-
conceited, psychopaths often attempt to counter the observer’s impression of their lawlessness by 
claiming to live according to their own, self-legislated rules: 
“It’s not that I don’t follow the law,” said one of our subjects.  “I follow my own laws.  I 
never violate my own rules.”  She then described these rules in terms of “looking out for 
number one.”148 
 
 Kant would find the moral blindness of psychopaths perfectly explicable within the terms of his 
theory of moral psychology.  Because of a self-conceit which is abnormally resistant to humiliation, 
psychopaths cannot respect the moral law.  For this reason, they cannot be made conscious of their 
duty, or even, properly speaking, what the idea of a moral duty consists in.  With no consciousness of 
the moral law to guide them, and no respect for duty to check and strike down their self-assertive 
inclinations, it is no wonder that psychopaths behave as if they were morally insane.  They are.    
III.1.4.1 A Modern View:  Susan Wolf and the “Sane Deep Self” View of Moral Responsibility 
 A compelling modern view which may shed further light on the moral responsibility of 
psychopaths is Susan Wolf’s “sane deep self” theory.  In her essay, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of 
Responsibility,”149 Wolf considers each of three mutually similar theories of moral responsibility 
advanced by philosophers Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Charles Taylor, respectively.  All three 
accounts, in Wolf’s estimation, reflect a concern to defend moral responsibility against determinism, 
and all seek to do so by positing the existence of a “deep self” within each moral agent.  Their shared 
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intuition is that “in order to be responsible for one’s actions, one must be responsible for the self that 
performs these actions.”150   
Thus, Frankfurt distinguishes two kinds of freedom, both of which an agent must possess in 
order to be morally responsible:  freedom of action and freedom of the will.  The former is simply the 
freedom to do whatever you will to do, while the latter is the freedom to will whatever you want to will.  
This distinction motivates another, that between first- and second-order desires.  “In order for an agent 
to have both freedom of action and freedom of the will, that agent must be capable of governing his or 
her actions by first-order desires and capable of governing his or her first-order desires by second-order 
desires.”151  By way of illustration, assume I have a first-order desire to play chess on the internet by the 
hour every day, but I find this habit cutting into the time I could devote to studying philosophy, which I 
also have a first-order desire to do.  In deciding how best to resolve this apparent conflict, I reason that 
the benefits of philosophical study far outweigh the benefits of playing internet chess:  perhaps I gain a 
greater understanding of the world and of the human condition by studying philosophy, whereas I 
merely get a series of intense headaches and a vague disquiet of time-profligacy from playing internet 
chess.  Consequently, I form a second-order desire not to want to play chess on the internet so much, 
and I end up stopping altogether. 
Watson’s and Taylor’s views are similar to Frankfurt’s.  Watson distinguishes between ordinary 
desires and desires that reflect values held by the moral agent.  According to him, actions that are truly 
free are “expressions of judgments on my part that the objects I desire are good.  Insofar as my actions 
can be governed by the latter type of desire … they are actions that I perform freely and for which I am 
responsible.152   Taylor’s view reflects this too.  Our freedom and responsibility depend on “our ability to 
reflect on, criticize, and revise our selves.”  Even though we begin life with some of our character fixed 
by heredity and upbringing, our freedom and responsibility depend on our ability to look at ourselves, 
criticize what we see, and change.153  Wolf succinctly summarizes these views this way: 
For Frankfurt, this means that our wills must be ruled by our second-order desires; for 
Watson, that our wills must be governable by our system of values; for Taylor, that our 
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wills must issue from selves that are subject to self-assessment and redefinition in terms 
of a vocabulary of worth.154 
Put differently, in order for an agent to be morally responsible, it is not enough that her actions be 
guided by her will; it must also be the case that her will be “within the control of *her+ sel[f] in some 
deeper sense.”155   
This shared commitment to a revising and governing “deep self,” however, appears to run 
aground on a metaphysical problem.  For where does the deep self come from?  In order for it to serve 
the anti-determinist function for which its proponents intended it – that is, in order for one to be 
responsible for one’s own deep self, and so for the actions produced by it – it would appear that one 
must be the creator of one’s own deep self, a manifestly impossible condition.156  The proponents of the 
deep-self view may reply that the ability to revise the self and its actions in light of one’s experience is 
enough for moral responsibility.  But Wolf disputes the sufficiency of self-revision.  Instead, she argues 
that only self-correction will suffice, and that true self-correction requires what she terms deep-self 
“sanity”:  “the minimally sufficient ability cognitively and normatively to recognize and appreciate the 
world for what it is.”157  
In support of this contention, Wolf offers the story of Saïf.158  Saïf is the favorite son of an evil 
tyrant, Muammar, who rules his oil-rich country with an iron fist.  Because of Muammar’s special 
feelings for Saïf, Muammar brings Saïf along with him on all his official business.  On these occasions, 
and in the course of his education and training, Saïf absorbs all his father’s despotical values, including 
the exercise of absolute power and the brutal suppression of all dissent.  Naturally, he ends up 
becoming just like his father.  Now, Saïf possesses the ability to revise himself, but due to his upbringing 
he doesn’t want to.  He is just as he wants to be.  Nevertheless, we have the intuition that Saïf is not 
fully responsible for the terrible course he follows upon assuming power.  For Wolf, this shows that the 
capacity for self-revision is not enough for moral responsibility.  Saïf’s upbringing has deprived him of 
the ability to correct himself in light of certain normative characteristics of the world.  He can no longer 
tell right from wrong.  His deep self is insane.159  We, in contrast,  
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[b]eing sane, are able to understand and evaluate our characters in a reasonable way, to 
notice what there is reason to hold on to, what there is reason to eliminate, and what, 
from a rational and reasonable standpoint, we may retain or get rid of as we please.  
Being able as well to govern our superficial selves by our deep selves, then, we are able 
to change the things we find there is reason to change.  This being so, it seems that 
although we may not be metaphysically responsible for ourselves – for, after all, we did 
not create ourselves from nothing – we are morally responsible for ourselves, for we are 
able to understand and appreciate right and wrong, and to change our characters and 
our actions accordingly. 
 On Wolf’s “sane deep self” account of moral responsibility, the psychopath is no more morally 
responsible than Saïf.  She is arguably far less.  Her empathy impairment is under strong genetic 
influence.  Moreover, even the best parental strategy for inculcating moral values in a child – the 
strategy known as “induction,” which recruits the natural proclivity of children to find the sight of 
others’ suffering unpleasant – is largely ineffective for children with psychopathic tendencies.         
III.1.4.2 Psychopathy’s Characteristic Empathy Impairment Is Under Strong Genetic Influence   
The empathy impairment characteristic of psychopathy is under strong genetic influence.160  A 
study published in 2005161 used data from the Twins Early Development Study, “a birth-record-based 
representative sample of twins born in the U[nited ]K[ingdom] 1994-96 *citation+.”162  Among the data 
published in the twins study were teacher ratings of callousness or seeming lack of emotion (“CU”) for 
3487 pairs of twins at seven years old.163  The authors of the 2005 study focused on those children 
whose CU ratings were 1.31 or more standard deviations above the mean – some 459 twin pairs.164  
They then analyzed how much of this difference could be attributed to genetic influence (“group 
heritability”) and how much to other factors (“group shared environmental influence”).165  The results:  
“*T+wo-thirds of the difference between the extreme [CU] children and the population can be explained 
genetically.”166  Results from twelve other twin studies by various authors indicate that genetic influence 
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accounts for between 40% and 60% of the CU and impulsive/irresponsible traits in psychopathic children 
and adolescents.167   
III.1.4.3 Implications for Moral Socialization of Children With Psychopathic Characteristics 
As Blair and others point out,168 psychopathic empathy impairment in childhood potentially has 
grave implications for the moral socialization of children affected.  A survey of parenting studies169 
concluded that of the three categories of parental discipline strategies – “power assertion, love 
withdrawal, and induction”170 – by far the most effective for inculcating morals in children is 
induction.171   Induction is:   
characterized by attempts on the part of the disciplinary agent to reason with children.  
The goal of the disciplinarian is to make children understand why their transgressions 
are wrong, why they should follow various rules and regulations, and how they might 
alter their behavior to achieve that end.172 
Induction is “particularly effective” when it “focus*es+ on the child’s intentions and … stress[es] the 
harmful consequences that prohibited acts may have on others.”173  As Blair points out, however, this 
strategy is largely unavailable to parents of empathy-deficient children.   
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 It is also worth observing that warmth and affection in interactions between parent and child 
are thought to be “an important determinant of the effectiveness of any particular disciplinary strategy 
[citations].”174  Children with psychopathic tendencies, however, are not natural objects of affection; 
they are “inexplicably ‘different’ from normal children – more difficult, willful, aggressive, and deceitful; 
harder to ‘relate to’ or get close to; less susceptible to influence and instruction; and always testing the 
limits of social tolerance.”175  The unpleasantness of such a child makes it less likely that warmth and 
affection would characterize his relationship with his parents.  Thus, even if the parent employs the 
induction disciplinary strategy to morally socialize her CU child, the lack of warmth that is likely to 
characterize their relationship will reduce its effectiveness, over and above the reduction which the 
child’s empathy impairment already works.  Put differently, a child with psychopathic tendencies is 
disabled from taking full advantage of even the best disciplinary strategy available to his parents, due to 
an empathy deficit which is under strong genetic influence.  
 The result is an individual who lacks the capacity for self-correction necessary for moral 
responsibility.  As Cleckley writes, expressing a pathos which those to whom the passage refers will 
never feel: 
To … consider [the psychopath] on a basis of those values somewhat vaguely implied by 
“intellectuality,” “culture,” or, in everyday speech, by “depth of mind,” we find an 
appalling deficiency.  These concepts in which meaning or emotional significance are 
considered along with the mechanically rational, if applied to this man, measure him as 
very small, or very defective.  He appears not only ignorant in such modes of function 
but stupid as well.  He is unfamiliar with the primary facts or data of what might be 
called personal values and is altogether incapable of understanding such matters.  It is 
impossible for him to take even a slight interest in the tragedy or joy or the striving of 
humanity as presented in serious literature or art.  He is also indifferent to all these 
matters in life itself.  Beauty and ugliness, except in a very superficial sense, goodness, 
evil, love, horror, and humor have no actual meaning, no power to move him.  He is, 
furthermore, lacking in the ability to see that others are moved.  It is as though he were 
colorblind, despite his sharp intelligence, to this aspect of human existence.  It cannot 
be explained to him because there is nothing in his orbit of awareness that can bridge 
the gap with comparison.  He can repeat the words and say glibly that he understands, 
and there is no way for him to realize that he does not understand.176   
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III.2.1 Criminal Punishment, Particularly Imprisonment and Execution, Expresses Society’s Blame of 
Those on Whom It Inflicts Such Punishment 
 Criminal punishment derives much of its force from the fact that it expresses society’s 
condemnation of the offender for the act of which she has been found guilty.  As Joel Feinberg wrote in 
“The Expressive Function of Punishment,” what all punishments have in common, and that which sets 
them apart from mere penalties, is that 
punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the 
punishment authority himself or of those “in whose name” the punishment is inflicted.  
Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of 
penalties.177 
Incarceration amounts to a public shaming, a stigmatizing of the offender for the bad act which he has 
committed.178  Much as brides wear white, widows black, and champagne is for celebrations, a sentence 
of imprisonment signifies society’s hatred and fear of, and contempt for, the offender.179 
III.2.2 Psychopaths Should Not Be Subjected To Criminal Punishment 
 Blame is part and parcel of criminal punishment.  But, much like those to whom the criminal law 
already affords a defense of insanity, psychopaths do not deserve blame because, through no fault of 
their own, they are not full moral agents.  They come into the world with a strong genetic predisposition 
towards a profound empathy deficit.  Their lack of empathy, in turn, blinds them to normativity, so that 
they fail to grasp the concept of moral rules and its attendant concept of moral duty.  This same 
emotional deficit denies them what would otherwise be their best chance to acquire the rudiments of 
moral socialization in childhood – the inductive parental strategy, which depends on empathy for its 
effectiveness.  Lacking the concept of moral value, or standards by which to assess themselves and the 
mark they make on the world, they naturally see no need for self-correction, failing even to understand 
what this could mean.  They are, if anything, far more profoundly and hopelessly mired in moral insanity 
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than Wolf’s hypothetical JoJo (and my likely-all-too-real Saïf).  As such, they cannot be considered 
morally responsible, and so do not deserve blame. 
IV.           Conclusion 
Both Utilitarian deterrence and Retributivist desert considerations ground the criminal law’s 
insanity defense.  From the Utilitarian standpoint, it is pointless to use punishment to deter from 
criminality those who, due to mental illness, cannot be deterred.  From the Retributivist standpoint, 
those who commit crimes because they are mentally ill do not deserve criminal blame and punishment.   
In this essay, I have argued that there is no principled ground on which to distinguish 
psychopathy from the forms of mental illness for which the law presently allows criminal defendants to 
invoke the defense of insanity.  The specific deterrence rationale assumes that punishing a criminal will 
render him less willing to engage in criminality afterwards because of the memory of his punishment 
and his association of that painful experience with criminality.  As the above-cited neuroscience studies 
suggest, however, psychopathy is characterized by deficits in precisely those abilities on which special 
deterrence depends.  Psychopaths are drastically impaired, relative to non-psychopaths, in forming 
mental associations between a painful stimulus – criminal punishment, for example – and the events 
that typically precede it.  They are drastically impaired in fear response, as well, an impairment which 
further undermines the monitory function of their memory of punishment.  And they are drastically 
impaired in recognizing and reacting to a change in the calculus of costs and benefits, characteristically 
following a losing course of action far longer than non-psychopaths do.   
The general deterrence rationale is similarly undermined where psychopaths are concerned.  
General deterrence depends on the would-be criminal’s emotional response to the prospect of being 
punished rendering him less willing to follow through to the prohibited act.  As the above-cited 
neuroscience studies suggest, however, psychopaths are dramatically impaired in their response to 
emotional imagery.  Thus, neither form of deterrence finds the sort of mental equipment in psychopaths 
on which its effectiveness depends. 
The empathy deficit which characterizes psychopathy calls into question the desert justification 
for punishing psychopaths.  This deficit is under strong genetic influence, and manifests itself in children 
with psychopathic tendencies as young as seven years old.  It vitiates the otherwise most effective 
moral-socialization technique – empathy-based induction – thus undermining one of the chief curbs on 
criminal behavior.  It also explains the psychopaths’ inability to distinguish between moral and 
conventional rules, a distinction which is crucial to moral reasoning.  Psychopaths’ empathy deficit thus 
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underlies a profound moral reasoning impairment, one which disqualifies them from being full moral 
agents.  Because the deficits characterizing psychopathy so deeply undercut both the Utilitarian and 
Retributivist rationales for punishment, and dovetail so closely with the respective justifications for the 
insanity defense, the law should be changed to allow criminal psychopaths to invoke the defense of 
insanity.       
This conclusion raises the question of how society should protect itself from psychopaths who 
have committed crimes and are deemed to be dangerous.  I lack the space to address this question in 
detail here.  In future work, I will argue that dangerous psychopaths should be subject to “civil 
commitment” under procedures analogous to those recently upheld by the United States Supreme 
Court for violent sex offenders.                  
 
